There are parts of this book which are engaging reading, but for the most part it is a set of sterile-if painful-renditions of the lives of 16 POWs in North Korean prison camps from 1950 thru their release under operations Little and Big Switch. Mr. Spiller edited this book, leaving the personal accounts largely untouched. However, his editing leaves much to be desired. Consider Donald Elliot: he joined the Army on Nov. 25, 1950, but there are references to 'his unit' being in action as early as August 19th, 1950 in Pusan. Even worse is Daniel Johnson's story. There are references to the Pusan Perimeter Battles...in February, 1951?? It is possible that Johnson might be confusing the several Chinese offensives of early 1951 with the steady attack by the NKPA the previous summer; but even so, for Spiller not to correct these misconceptions is ridiculous and detracts from the rest of the book. Spiller could also have more effectively and uniformly summarized the pre-war pre-enlistment experiences of his subjects.

There were three general phases to the POW experience for most of these men. The first was the 'marching phase' when they walked-often barefoot and poorly clad in bitterly cold weather-from their point of capture to camps deep in NK, near the Yalu. The 2nd phase lasted until October 1951, when control of the camps was delegated largely to Chinese control. This 2nd phase resulted in enormous percentages (40%) of deaths from starvation, malnutrition and denial of medical care by pitiless NKPA guards. The Chinese, who took over for the 3rd phase in late 1951, were better; treatment of POWs improved, at least as much as the PLA's limited resources would allow.

I found meaningful commentary and analysis in all 16 of these interviews. Several men refer to night blindness among prisoners and guards, a consequence of few vegetables in their diet. Some of the men even used this to their advantage in the camps. Nor are all the renditions monotony about torture, lice, cold, and dysentery. Funchess and Osborne referred to pranks and crazy weeks in the camps; one commandant even offered a bag lunch and 2 hours head start to any POW who wanted to try and escape. Private Paul Smith escaped from his POW camp-then again, he had experience, having done the same from a German camp in WWII. Several men discussed marijuana use and abuse in the camps; the weed grew wild throughout North Korea, and the Turkish POWs noticed it first. Sometimes the Chinese would throw bags of the weed into the barracks and the men would roll it in newspapers. All of them referred to starvation, lack of medical treatment, and infectious diseases as the scourge of life in the camps, where 40% of prisoners died. There are numerous references to differences in treatment by Chinese vs. North Korean guards, the latter far more cruel. Chinese interrogators, Bill Gaddy says, 'respected tough prisoners; they had no room for collaborators.'

The appropriately named Willfred Ruff taunted and slapped some of his guards and paid a high price; still, armchair flagwaving rightwingers (damn there are a lot of them in post 9-11 america) might want to look long and hard about how this man felt about one collaborator in particular.

Several of the interviews stand head and shoulders above the others. Ken Neville's story is by far the most cerebral and analytical account of his days in the camps. He has a precise account of his feelings, the games he played to try and deceive and appease his interrogators; and a lot of thoughtful reflection about how his POW experience affected his later life. Much the same can be said about Donald Slagle: readers of James Thompsons "True Colors" might enjoy Slagle's comments about the same camp V. Read about how he darned socks from a small blanket; used garlic to purge tapeworms (unlike the Turkish prisoners, who just pulled them out of their butt when they got long enough). A postscript to the Slagle story states that many POWs kept an oath of silence because collaboration investigations and trials. For more on this issue see Raymond Lech's "Broken Soldiers"

In general a worthwhile book to read. I hope a 2nd edition is released with the editing errors rectified.

I recommend the book to any serious reader of the Korean War. To hear from the mouths of these men of the hell they went through at the hands of their captors.

Well-Crafted. Recommended for collectors and history buffs. Library Journal January 1999

David McLaren's "Mustangs Over Korea" is thoroughly researched and presented with astonishing detail. The topic is at once chivalrous, romantic, and tragically farcical. The United States was caught unprepared as it reacted to the opening of Korean War hostilities in 1950. For instance, the scaled-down, post-World War II U.S. Air Force had no choice but to scrounge together obsolescent, prop-driven Mustang fighters to provide the initial air combat support to resist the communist invasion of South Korea. The dire need for pilots was largely met by calling up reservists-veterans of WWII who were asked to interrupt career and family pursuits back in the states. Gruesome combat conditions ensured that separation from home for many of these young men would be permanent. The primary audience for this book will be veterans of the Korean War who were in some way involved in F-51 Mustang operations. "Mustangs Over Korea" is usually anecdotal in approach, since so much of the text depends on recollections of the aging combatants. Military unit records, which seem to excel in documenting casualties, are also a key source for this book. Accordingly, much of the text chronicles pilot losses. The reader can gain a great deal of gritty insight from the anecdotes and the appendices, but additional analysis is sometimes wanted. A notable exception is McLaren's intriguing analysis of the apparent strategies of the (opposing) North Korean Air Force. The book's second printing would benefit from professional editing to remove the text's frequent lapses in grammar and punctuation.

This is one of the best historical books I have come across . The korean war is at best only lyttle known , but the author went to all ends to make this a top class reference work . Also included are some photographs that you will not find anywhere else and a fine appendix that covers pilots and aircraft from all the countries involved in the conflict .

This is an interesting addition to the military history collection. The book is an account of indigent intelligence gathering and sabotage operations behind the lines in North Korea. A few U.S. Army Officers and Enlisted men were tabbed as advisors to assist North Korean nationals in the disruption of the Communist forces north of the DMZ. For the most part well written, the narrative is most worthy by demonstrating the reluctance, if not downright obstructionism shown by senior Army members toward unconventional warfare in this period. The young officers selected for the mission generally had little if any training or background for the job and were given minimal support. A good accounting of the initiative and ingenuity of our young college grads when thrown in a difficult position.

(Note: Part of the details furnished here are based on my discussions with the author shortly after White Tigers was originally released)

First, I'll have to say I'm a bit prejudiced toward Ben Malcom. COL Ben Malcom was the post commander at Fort McPherson, Georgia in the late 70's and I commanded his military police company. In fact, Ben was instrumental in my career -- first he allowed me to command a company as a first lieutenant, something his predecessor would not do. Second, he literally pushed my application for a regular army commission through and made sure it was approved. Ben is a true gentleman and was a fine Army officer.

On to the book. White Tigers recounts Ben's story, from ROTC to the Infantry, and shortly after his commission, to Korea. Ben was scheduled to be a rifle platoon leader in Korea, but was somewhat randomly selected to train North Korean partisans --- behind enemy lines. What was so remarkable about Ben's selection is that he is over 6', has no oriental features, and did not speak Korean.

Ben found himself behind enemy lines where he trained a battalion-size North Korean force, and managed to get to the mainland on more than one occasion to recruit and do combat -- where he was awarded the Silver Star.

My favorite portion of the book is Ben recounting how he left Korea after a year wearing the Silver Star, but no combat patch (his unit did not have patch) and no combat infantryman's badge (his unit was not recognized as a line infantry unit that qualified for the CIB). When Ben reported in to his next unit, his superiors asked how it was that he was wearing a silver star, but no combat patch or CIB. Ben's answer: "I'm sorry, I can't disclose that because it's classified."

And Ben's operations were classified -- in fact, for more than 40 years. Ben had started a book in the mid-50s, but terminated his efforts because of the classification of the operations in which he was involved. Once the operations were declassified in the early 90s, Ben dusted off his 40-year old manuscript, which served as the basis for White Tigers.

I will have to say that White Tigers is not an accomplished thriller -- however, what it is is a fine personal account of Ben's exploits in a very unusual operation. Many of the activities that Ben was involved in -- and many that he directed ad lib due to the lack of training and doctrine --have become the basis of some special operations today.

Ben deserves a huge well done for an outstanding effort in documenting a very unusual experience. I would highly recommend his work.

Charles D. Childers Colonel, US Army

This is the larger story that contains in part East of Chosin, also by the author. The book talks about the roles of Marine and Army ground units, as well as Naval air support in the entire reservoir area and the MSR to evacuation at Hungnam. Despite the disaster east of the reservoir, the final evacuation to Hungnam occurred in a most professional mannner and in no way resembled a Dunkirk, despite US news media hysteria cooed on by their communist sympathizers.
On the other hand Appleman makes clear that while the Chinese had a manpower advantage (and even that was not as overwhelming as many thought), they had no artillery, tanks, air support or motor transit. Their largest weapons were small mortars.

Appleman is a powerful writer who elegantly weaves battlefield action, command decisions, and military analysis into a cogent text. Among his insights:
*** The 'gap' between 8th army and X corps (occupied by the savage peaks of the Taebek range) was of no military significance and had no bearing on the outcome of operations in North Korea/Chosin.
*** General Almond did have reservations about pushing deeply into the reservoir area. However, after the Chinese 'disappeared' into the hills, McArthur insisted they move forward and Almond complied.
*** The book has good summary coverage of the 37th RCT east of Chosin ['task force Faith']. Ironically, it was the Chinese 80th division encounter with TFF, rather than proceeding directly to Hagaru-ri, that may have cost the Chinese a crucial victory at the southern tip of Chosin, on their first night attack at Hagaru-ri.
*** Often overlooked in the successful breakout was the role of the Far East Cargo command, providing ammunition and medical supplies by the ton to the escaping convoy.
*** Task Force Dryesdale, a tank-led column from Koto-ri NORTH to reinforce Hagaru, suffered heavy losses; but those who did make it provided vitally needed, experienced reinforcements.
*** The 2nd Chinese attack at Hagaru-ri, although better organized, had lost the 'element of surprise', so the Chinese suffered massive losses. In fact, this defeat turned the tides in favor of the Army and Marines at Chosin.
*** Armchair analysts and military brats should compare Faith's verbal orders to his task force at the Pyongnuri-gang Inlet with the far more coordinated USMC air-ground withdrawal from Yudam-ni and beyond.
*** Still, Appleman gives a far better account of the performance of Army units in the march south of Hagaru-ri than Donald Knox and others have. This is especially true on hill 1081 near Funchilin pass, with frequent praise of Captains Rasula and Kitz and Lt. Colonel Page.

Especially useful is the last chapter where Appleman evaluates Chinese and X corps command and field decisions. Appleman feels the Chinese were correct to attack UN forces directly at Chosin. An attack further north would have left Hungnam open for evacuation or reinforcement. An attack further south would not be a surprise since X-corps knew Chinese were in the area.
Appleman feels the Chinese attack at Chosin failed for several reasons. First, their manpower advantage was not as overwhelming as many writers suggest. 'Human Wave' tactics were largely a myth, though the Chinese often massed attacks on one spot. Perhaps most important, the US Marines did not panic: they remained and fought in their perimeters (no better example than Fox company at Toktong pass) as they moved south.
Appleman slips into military jargon--"element of surprise"; "mass of forces"; still, at Hagaru the Chinese lost the former and didn't capitalize on the latter. He also is stretching military journalism a bit in his references to "Xenophon's retreat from Asia Minor." But the fact remains that the Marines knew they had to control the higher ground in order to retreat. The Army did not: neither east of Chosin, nor in the west at Kunu-ri.

The book of Erik Cornell is unique and orginal Eyewitness Report from North korea. In mid of Seventies North Korea try open diplomatic relations with western european countries. Sweden, Denmark, Finland accepted this proves. Erik Cornell organised swedish Embassy in Pyongyang. He written about odrganisation obstacles . Typical is history with north Korean bank not accepted cheq from swiss bank. I hade tis situation in small scele in 1987.
Exchange cheq issued by Polish National Bank dued two weeks. Was lot visit in bank with comic talks. Interst was history about cheap liquor shop in Stockholm. This cheap sfop was DPRK embassy in Stokholm. This was begin North Korea,s Juche diplomacy. to this day north korean diplomats smuggling alcochol, cigarets and drugs. Another activity is illegal renting diplomatic rooms and buildings to commercial use. I now tis activity from DPRK Embasy in Poland. Interst was picture life diplomatic corps in Pyongyang. Special the relations with diplomats with East Block including Poland. Book detaily written everyday life DPRK and behaviour North Korean Foreifn Ministry officials. Seden together with Poland are members Neutral Supervisors Nations Commission. He informed about work this commission. 27 of July this year is
50 Anniversary of Korean Armistice. Korea is still divided, and book Erik Cornell is very usefull to understanding korean queation. I have strong recommended to reading all to interest korean issue.

This book is a very good book to begin exploration of the ongoings between North and South Korean since the Korean War. Mr. Kirkbride is knowledgable on a variety of events which have ensued following the Korean War. This book provides its reader with a great beginning point for exploring the subject and a good summary of major events since the Korean War.

There were two negatives to this book. The first was that the summaries of the events were not very detailed, and sometimes it was difficult to actually know the outcome of the situation. Had I not been already familiar with the incidents, I would not have fully understood their significance. The second negative was a lack of editing. There were numerous typographical errors throughout the book. For me, this is a big detractor and the primary reason I rated the book with 4 stars.

If you are looking for a solid compilation of major aggressions which have occurred between North and South Korea since the resolution of the Korean Conflict in 1953, this is a very good book.

...but someone had to do it: this look inside North Korea is based exclusively on the writings of Kim Il-sung. This gives the book its undeniable strengths, though at the same time after 200 pages it feels like one has been trapped in the Great Leader's funhouse mirrors of lies and deceptions. A nice companion volume to other works such as Nicholas Eberstadt's "The End of North Korea" and Marcus Noland's "Avoiding the Apocalypse" which step out side the funhouse for a less distorted view.

In general, this is about (part of) Chosin operation. The author was the commander of H&R company of 1st Battalion, 1st Marine during Chosin operation. He gave a good account about the hardship the marines endured during the operation. Mind that his battalion was assigned the task of taking Hill 1081 and wrestled the control of Funchilin Pass out from superior Chinese Communist Part (CCP) forces. Unfortunately, he was in such a position that he spent most of his time staying very close to battalion HQ and could not provide more details about the fighting. (Interesting readers should look up S.L.A. Marshall's "Battle at Best". There is a chapter dedicated to the battle of Funchilin Pass.) But, it is still a good book with the first hand account of the Chosin. Of course, nobody who are interesting in Korea War would want to miss the two very valuable reports about CCP troops' attack patterns, written by S.L.A. Marshall himself, attached at the end of the book.

Hyun Hee Kim's training as a paramilitary agent reads like a spy novel, and if true, provides an interesting view into the Orwellian world of North Korea.

Her training in sabotage, foreign language, and intelligence tradecraft are detailed, as is her deprogramming in South Korea after she was caught blowing up a civilian airliner in the 1980s.

Some have speculated as to how reliable her account is, but I found myself not caring about this question, though it's an important one. The book is an exciting and quick read that will keep you engaged until the end.

A couple of million Korean people (civilians) were killed during the war mostly by US bombing. What would you call this killing? Those Korean killed are as precious as those American and UN soldiers who perished in Korea to their parents, brothers and friends. Do we expect a similar book dealing with the same issue but from the opposite angle from the author? Or are war crimes always committed by the enemy?

Most modern people's knowledge with the Korean War is probably limited to what they see in the television show, "M*A*S*H". Given this, they probably believe that the NKPA and Chinese weren't so bad with prisoners. Nothing could be further from the truth. This book documents the horrendous atrocities dealt out to US and Allied troops during the Korean War from loading up wounded on trucks and sending them over cliffs to using POW's as bayonet dummies. Furthermore it details POW's released after the ceasefire and has evidence that many more POW's were still held in communist custody.

This book is a must read for anyone interested in the Korean War.

The author has done a wonderful job exposing the brutality of the Chinese and North Korean troops during the Korean War. This is a so-far-little-researched subject that needs to be investigated further as it helps us understand the nature of the same (Chinese/North Korean) regimes we are facing today.